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ORDINARY INCOME OR CAPITAL GAIN ON THE SALE OF
AN ORANGE GROVE
JAMES P. HILL *
Since the early 1940's, the inflated price level has made the sale of citrus
groves in Florida having a relatively low cost basis more and more attractive
to grove owners.
Obviously, the income tax consequences of these sales to the owners of
groves having substantial unrealized appreciation is of prime importance.
There are, of course, numerous income tax problems, potential and actPal,
which grow out of the sale or exchange of any appreciated real estate.
This discussion will be limited to one highly important facet of these
tax problems which deals with the question of whether or not the seller of
citrus groves with growing fruit on the trees must, for federal income tax
purposes, allocate a portion of the selling price to the land and trees, when
such a sale is consummated on a lump sum basis.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1946 ruled I that the seller of a grove
with fruit on the trees was compelled for federal income tax purposes to al-
locate a portion of the selling price to the fruit and the balance to land and
trees. The gain from the sale of the fruit will constitute ordinary income. The
gain from the sale of the land and trees will be treated as capital gain under
section 117(j) of the Internal Revenue Code, provided the recognized gains
from all transactions coming within the purview of that section exceed the
recognized losses thereunder.
When a farmer sells timber land which lie has owned for more than six
months at a profit of $30,000.00, the entire profit is treated as long term capital
gain and only $15,000.00 is recognized gain for income tax purposes. On the
other hand, if the Bureau of Internal Revenue is correct in its position under
IT. 3815, where a farmer sells his citrus grove which he has owned for more
than six months at a profit of $30,000.00 and the value of the fruit on the
trees is $20,000.00, the recognized gain for income tax purposes is $25,000.00.
Of this $25,000.00 recognized gain, $20,000.00 is treated as ordinary income,
and the remaining $5,000.00 as capital gain.
A great many people, perhaps with some justification, feel that the Bureau
of Internal Revenue has no right to tax these two transactions differently.
If the Bureau is in error, the error can be very costly to those engaged in the
* Member of Florida Bar-Jacksonville Bar Association.
1. I.T. 3815 46-2 CuM. BULL. 30.
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business of producing citrus fruit. Eventually this question will be settled
but it is far from being a settled issue now.
The extent to which rulings like I.T. 3815 are binding upon taxpayers
is often a question of great difficulty. There are two general types of regula-
tions or rulings issued by the Bureau. In some instances the ruling merely sets
forth the Treasury's interpretation of the proper construction of the law.
I.T. 3815 is that type of ruling, and it does not have the force and effect
of law. The other type of regulation is that issued by the Bureau after Con-
gress passes a statute in broad terms and specifically delegates to the Bureau
power to promulgate regulations covering the details of the law. This latter
type of regulation, if not unreasonable, will usually be deemed to have the
force and effect of law.
The income taxable under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
is a purely statutory net income and the Bureau's interpretation of the
Code has not always been sustained by the courts. In approaching any tax
question, and especially such a problem as the validity of I.T. 3815, the
principal concern is what the Code provides with respect to that subject.
The statutory provision governing the question is section 117(j) of the
Internal Revenue Code. That section permits a taxpayer to treat as capital
gains profits from the sale of real or depreciable property used in the tax-
payer's trade or business which he has held for more than six months. It ex-
cludes property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, and also excludes
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business.2
Section 117(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that in the case
of a taxpayer other than a corporation, only fifty per cent of the gain or loss
recognized upon the sale or exchange of a capital asset, held for more than
six months, shall be taken into account in computing net capital gain, net
loss, or net income.
In order for a taxpayer to cast a transaction within the provision of sec-
tion 117(j), permitting him to treat the sale of a grove for a lump sum as a
sale of a capital asset, the burden is upon him to show all of the following
facts :
(1) That the grove sold was used in his trade or business;
(2) Was real property or property of a kind subject to an allowance for
depreciation;
(3) Was held for more than six months;
(4) Was not property of a kind includible in the inventory of the tax-
payer if on hand at the close of the taxable year;
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.117-1 and § 29.117-7 (as amended by T.D. 5394),
1944 CuM. BULL. 274, 276).
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(5) Was property of a kind not held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
the material which follows will be an attempt to analyze the validity of
the Bureau's ruling I.T. 3815 when tested against the five elements of a
117(j) transaction enumerated above.
1. TRADE OR BUSINESS
This requirement will give little or no difficulty for the taxpayer. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue conceded in I.T. 3815 that the production of fruit
from orchards or groves constitutes a trade or business and that section
117(j) of the Code is applicable to the sale of an orchard or grove.
2. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO AN ALLOWANCE FOR DEPRECIATION
This requirement, as the preceding one, will cause no difficulty. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue long ago recognized that producing orchards are
subject to depreciation.8
3. A PROPERTY HELD FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS
Nothing need be said of this requirement other than that the grove sought
to be sold at long term capital gain rates must have been held more than six
months prior to date of the closing of the sale.
4. PROPERTY NOT OF A KIND INCLUDIBLE IN INVENTORY
This requirement will cause the taxpayer considerably more concern
than the preceding three, since the very essence of the problem is to get a long
term capital gain on the sale of growing fruit as well as on the trees and
land.
Section 22(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that, when in-
ventories are necessary in order to determine the income of a taxpayer,
the inventories shall be taken upon such basis as is prescribed by the Commis-
sioner as conforming to the best accounting practice, and as most clearly
reflecting income. Acting upon that authority the Bureau has ruled 4 that
farmers cannot inventory growing crops. The reason given was that the value
of such crops could not be accurately determined. That ruling would appear
to have the effect of law, and to eliminate fruit on the trees from that type of
non-capital asset referred to in the Code as being "property includible in the
inventory of the taxpayer."
3. O.D. 797 4 Cum. BULL. 214 (1921).
4. I.T. 1368 1-1 CUM. BULL. 72.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
5. PROPERTY NOT HELD BY THE TAXPAYER PRIMARILY FOR SALE TO
CUSTOMERS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS
This requirement can readily be said to be the crux of the instant prob-
lem. It will be the one most difficult to meet, and the one most vulnerable to
attack by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
It must be pointed out that section 117(j), as indicated by its
title, deals with gains and losses from the sale or exchange of certain real and
personal property used in trade or business.
The section is divided into two main paragraphs. Paragraph 1 defines
property used in trade or business. Paragraph 2 explains the general rule
which gives capital asset treatment to the sale of property used in trade
or business as such property is specifically defined in paragraph 1.
Paragraph 1 defines the term "property used in trade or business"
as "property used in trade or business, of a character which is subject
to allowance for depreciation ... .held for more than six months and real
property used in trade or business, held for more than six months, which is
not . . . property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business."
It seems fairly clear that growing fruit is not property of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation. If, however, it could be
established that growing fruit is a part of the real estate on which it is grown,
and while still on the tree is not property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, it would
appear that we could bring the sale of growing fruit within the purview of
the section.
The Internal Revenue Code in no place defines the term real property.
Because of this fact, the ordinary meaning of the term as developed under
the general law should prevail.6
It is fairly well established that fruit unless actually or constructively
severed from the tree on which it grows is a part of the realty and passes
to the purchaser upon a sale of the grove.
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted this rule in the case of Adams
v. Adams. 6 This case involved an action by a decedent's widow for a declara-
tory decree to determine whether the proceeds of citrus crops vent to the
widow as part of the homestead or to the personal representative as personal
property. The Supreme Court of Florida in holding that fruit on the trees of
the homestead land went to the widow as part of the realty said :
Appellants contend that the citrus fruit or the proceeds of it was personal
property and passed to the executors to be distributed under the will. To
support this contention they rely on Gentile Bros., Inc. v. Bryan, 101 Fla.
5. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
6. Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So. 2254 (1946).
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233, 133 So. 630. It is true that language in the latter case, if read in the
abstract, may be so construed, but, if read in its environment, we do not
think it permits this interpretation. The Court was confronted with a
mortgage lien given to secure supplies furnished and services rendered to
the grove exclusive of the land; the mortgage in other words related only
to the crop of citrus fruit. Under such circumstances the Court did say
that the 'Fruit when produced from such annual cultivation and attention
may in law be classed as fructus industriales and not fructus naturales when
the mortgage gives no lien upon or interest in the land or the trees.'
(1) We do not think this case rules the case at bar. In Simmons v. Williford,
60 Fla. 359, 53 So. 452, 453, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 735, this court approved
the rule that 'Crops of fruit growing on trees, whether regarded as fructus
naturales or fructus industriales, are in general parts of the realty, and,
unless reserved, go with the realty in its transfer. But by the acts and in-
tention of an owner of land containing bearing ftuit trees the growing fruit
may be converted into personalty for purposes of sale.' Summerlin v.
Orange Shores, Inc., 97 Fla. 996, 122 So. 508; E. C. Fritz & Co. v. Eldridge,
129 Fla. 647,176 So. 539; Griffith v. Hulion, 90 Fla. 582,107 So. 354; Miller
v. Carr, 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103, and other cases support this view.
This conclusion is supported by the Crop Lien Act, Chapter 10279, Acts
of 1925, and other acts which show conclusively the rule in this State to be
that crops unseparated from the trees or vine are a part of the real estate
till separated and follow the latter unless in terms reserved by the seller.
We find some exception to this rule, but it is the one generally approved
throughout the country. We do not overlook the contention of appellants
that growing citrus fruits are never fructus naturales but must at all times
be fructus industriales, because they require cultivation by hand. Much
learned discussion has been given to this distinction but it has been tempered
in this country by crop lien acts and by judicial interpretation. In Florida
the fruit follows the realty unless in terms reserved.
(2) It is accordingly our view that the citrus crops in question were a
part of the real estate and passed to the widow with the homestead, so the
judgment of the chancellor must be and is hereby affirmed.
This same rule represents the great weight of authority.7
The only state case on the subject making any reference to income tax-
ation is Young v. Bond of California.8 There a broker introduced Di Napoli,
a tax-conscious prospective purchaser, to Moores, an officer of the bank which
owned an orange grove. According to the statement of facts in the opinion:
When Di Napoli met Moores he said he was interested but that he
would insist on purchasing the property separately-$57,500 for the crop
and $67,500 for the land, in order to comply with the federal regulations
covering the payment of income taxes on capital gains as distinguished
from income.
7. 25 C.J.S. 7; 15 Am. Jur. 200.
8. Young v. Bank of California, 88 Cal. App. 2184 (1948).
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The sale was consummated but the bank refused to pay the broker a coin-
mission and he had no memorandum in writing. The broker sued for his
commission and was nonsuited. The judgment of nonsuit was affirmed. He
had contended that the oranges were personal property so that his agreement
for a commission for the sale of oranges was not required to be in writing
by the statute of frauds. In this connection, the court said:
Appellant contends that he should at least be compensated for the
sale of the growing crops. The sale was one transaction. The purchase price
was segregated between the land and the growing crops merely to meet the
federal regulations regarding income taxes---to show whether the purchase
price of the crops should be treated as capital gains or income. But growing
crops under our decisions are a part of the realty until severed just as
growing timber is part of the land. Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 583 (72
P. 171), List v, Sandell, 42 Cal. App. 2d, 505,507 (109 P. 2d 376). It is
undisputed that throughout all the dealings the parties herein treated the
sale of the land and crops as one transaction and there is nothing in the
record indicating that any one of them would have considered the sale of
one without the other. There is no basis upon which appellant can make a
segregation of the sale of the crops from the sale of the land and his case
must stand or fall upon the basis of a single transaction covering the entire
property.
The Board of Tax Appeals also adopted this rule at an early date. In
Parker v. Comm'r.,0 acquiesced in by the Cominissioner, 10 the Board stated,
The respondent claims that inasmuch as growing crops are realty
and belong to the land to which they are attached, their value is included
in the appraised value of the real estate. There can be no question as to the
general proposition of law that growing crops belong to the freehold and
in case of sale of the same pass to the purchaser, provided the seller owns
both the land and the crops. A different rule obtains where the interests of
tenants intervene.
In the event the taxpayer succeeds in proving that fruit neither
actually nor constructively served is a part of the real estate on which it is
growing, for purposes of the Code, he must then show by a preponderance
of the evidence that fruit on the trees was not held by him primarily for sale
in the ordinary course of trade or business to fully meet the fifth re uirement
of section 117(j) outlined above.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue in I.T. 3815 stated:
The production of fruit from orchards or groves constitutes a business,
and Section 117(j) of the Code, supra, is applicable to the sale of an
orchard or grove. The crops are produced with the primary purpose of sell-
ing the fruit to customers in the ordinary course of the business. Therefore.
regardless of their stage of development, any gain realized from the sale of
growing crops is ordinary income.
9. Parker v. Comm'r, 13 B.T.A. 1289 (1928).
10. VIII-1 CUM. BULL. 35.
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Attention is directed to the fact that the Bureau says it is of that character
regardless of its stage of development. Since the sale of immature fruit is
prohibited by state and federal law, we must assume that the Bureau means
that a citrus grove owner holds immature fruit for sale at some future time
when its maturity will permit it to be sold. If the fruit is a part of the realty
it may well be argued that fruit on the trees was not held for sale to customers
because the grove owner was not a dealer in citrus groves, but a producer of
fruit which he sold to customers, when the fruit became ripe and when it
became personal property upon severance from the tree.
There have been a series of recent income tax cases which by direct
analogy have a bearing on the question of when property is held "primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business" within the
meaning of section 117(j) of the Code. 1
These cases arose because of the Bureau of Internal Revenue's ruling
I.T. 366612 and I.T. 3712 Is which severely limit the extent to which live-
stock breeders could sell breeding animals under section 117(j) of the Code
and thus receive the preferred capital gains treatment on any profit so made.
There is no question that breeding animals are depreciable property used in
trade or business and any gain from the sale of such property is treated as
if it were capital gain if the sale meets the five requirements for the applica-
tion ot section 117(j). The Bureau of Internal Revenue has taken the position
that where a livestock man as a regular practice sells off eah year a part
of his breeding stock, and does not materially reduce the size of his normal
breeding herd, such sales are in the regular course of business and hence
section 117(j) is inapplicable. The United States Court of Appeals for the
8th Circuit and the Tax Court of the United States in the cases cited above 14
refused to follow the Bureau's position.
These cases are germane to the instant discussion in that they clearly in-
dicate that one should look at the particular purpose for which section 117(j)
property is held at the time of sale, against the background of what the regular
or normal business of the taxpayer is in order to determine whether or not
specific property is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of trade or business.
For example, a dairy farmer who from time to time sells off a part of
his stock makes such sales as an incident to his main business of producing
11. See Albright v. U.S. 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949), 49-1 USTC Par. 9215, 1949
P-H Vol. 5, Par. 72,381; Emerson v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. No. 115 (May 27, 1949), CCH
Dec. 16, 989; Fawn Lake Ranch Company v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. No. 153 (June 27, 1949),
CCH Dec. 17,061; Oberg v. Comm'r T.C. Memo Dec. CCH Dec. 17,016(M); Par.
49,134 P-H T.C- MEMO.
12. I.T. 3666, 1944 CuM. BULL. 270
13. I.T. 3715, 1945 Cumt. BuLL. 176.
14. See notes 12, 13 supra.
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dairy products. He does not hold these animals primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his business.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue is quite concerned over the fact that
a grove operator who sells his grove for a lump sum on December 31st could,
under the rule prior to I.T. 3815 and after the Revenue Act of 1942, succeed
in selling the grove at capital gain rates, and at the same time write off all
the expense of growing the crop against the net gain. But it is apparent that
this is precisely what Congress has seen fit to allow any taxpayer who sells
117 (j) property at a gain. For example, a calendar year taxpayer who, on
December 31st, sells at a gain a truck used in his trade purchased on January
1st of the same year is permitted to write off against such gain all allowable
depreciation and all ordinary repairs made on the equipment for the year.
If this seems to be an overly generous tax advantage to business men,
then the Congress should be approached to have 117(j) amended so as to
eliminate this preference.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has argued that because the purchaser
of a grove must make an allocation of the price he paid between the grove and
the fruit then on the trees in order to determine his profits when he sells the
fruit, that it follows that the seller of the grove should also make such an
allocation.
But that argument will not support the Bureau's position. -If the owner
of a vacant tract of land, a capital asset, sells it to a real estate dealer who
subdivided it for resale to his customers, the sale of the tract may be a capital
gain or loss to the seller though his purchaser, the dealer, will receive ordinary
income from the sale of the lots, and he must allocate a part of his cost to
each lot sold. It does not follow that because the dealer must make an allocation
of his cost of the realty, that the man from whom he bought must do likewise,
nor does it follow that because the dealer's income is ordinary income, the gain
to the man from whom he bought was not capital gain.
If a grove owner expects to sell his grove with fruit on the trees he should
consider the advisability of making such a sale by using the method normally
followed for converting ordinary income to capital gains.
This might be accomplished by conveying the grove to a wholly owned
corporation in return for its stock. Such a conveyance is a non-taxable
transfer.' 5 He may then sell the stock of the corporation to the proposed
purchaser, and be entitled to treat the gain as long term capital gain, if he
had owned the grove for more than six months. By following this plan the
grove owner who plans to sell his grove at a profit should be able to obtain
the preferential treatment afforded capital gains even if the courts approve
the Bureau's ruling in I.T. 3815.
Several cases are now pending in court in which the validity of I.T. 3815
IS. Int. Rev. Code 112(b) (5).
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has been challenged. One of these filed some time ago in the Tax Court of the
United States has been set for trial at an early date, and the decision of the
court on the question involved will probably be forthcoming soon. If the
decision of that court goes against the taxpayer, an appeal will almost certainly
be taken. If the decision is against the Bureau, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may take an appeal or he may issue a notice of non-acquiescence.
Thus forcing all taxpayers to litigate in order to obtain the benefits of capital
gains treatment in this type of case.
A great many citrus growers who have-sold their groves at a profit have
already paid income taxes in accordance with the Bureau's ruling set forth
in I.T. 3815.
It is not the intent of this article to say that the government is wrong
in its treatment of grove sales but rather that it may be wrong. One thing is
certain. It will be some time before anyone will know whether the government
is right or wrong. Those taxpayers, who have paid such a tax either at the time
of filing their returns or as a result of an audit of such return after it was filed,
may still file claims for refund of such tax if the refund is not barred by the
statute of limitations. This is not true, however, if the taxpayer made a com-
promise of the disputed tax liability with the commissioner, which had the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury or an assistant secretary or an
undersecretary.
Claims for refund of federal taxes must be filed within three years of the
time the return is filed or within two years of the time the tax is paid, which-
ever expires last.
The Treasury Department has prescribed a form on which to file such
claims. The filing of such a claim is a condition precedent to any action at
law for the recovery of such taxes. Such an action can be maintained only on
the grounds set forth in the claim for refund. The government has successfully
defended many cases which it would have lost had the claim for refund been
properly prepared.
In view of the doubt and uncertainty as to the proper tax to be paid
on profits from sale of groves, those taxpayers who have claimed I.T. 3815
should not waive their rights to refunds by failing to file claims, until some
authoritative decision approves the Bureau's interpretation of the law on this
subject.
